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 A B S T R A C T  
The purpose of this study is to test and find the influence of information asymmetry on 
earnings management with good corporate governance as moderating variable in 
banking sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)) in 2010-
2014. Earnings management variable was measured using the approach of Beaver and 
Engel (1996), information asymmetry variable was measured using the approach of 
bid-ask spread, and good corporate governance (GCG) variable was measured using 
GCG self-assessment. The research type used was quantitative research using second-
ary data. The population in this study was all banking sector companies listed on the 
IDX in 2010-2014. The number of samples was 15 banking companies taken from the 
total of 41 banking companies. Sampling technique was conducted using documenta-
tion. Methods of analysis used in this study were simple linear regression analysis and 
moderated regression analysis. The results of this study show that information asym-
metry has a significant influence on earnings management, and GCG moderates the 
influence of information asymmetry on earnings management. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh asimetri informasi terhadap ma-
najemen laba dengan tata kelola perusahaan sebagai variabel moderating pada peru-
sahaan sektor perbankan yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI)) pada 2010-
2014. Variabel manajemen laba diukur menggunakan pendekatan Beaver and Engel 
(1996), variabel asimetri informasi diukur menggunakan pendekatan spread bid-ask, 
dan variabel Good Corporate Governance (GCG) diukur menggunakan self-
assessment GCG. Jenis penelitian yang digunakan adalah penelitian kuantitatif 
yang menggunakan data sekunder. Populasi penelitian ini terdiri atas semua peru-
sahaan sektor perbankan yang terdaftar di BEI pada tahun 2010-2014. Jumlah sam-
pel adalah 15 perusahaan perbankan yang diambil dari total 41 perusahaan perban-
kan. Teknik pengambilan sampel dilakukan menggunakan dokumentasi. Metode 
analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis regresi linier sederha-
na dan analisis regresi moderat. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa asimetri 
informasi berpengaruh signifikan terhadap manajemen laba, dan GCG memoderasi 





Financial statement is a means of accounting for the 
manager to use the owner's resources. On one 
hand, accrual basis is chosen for preparing the fi-
nancial statement because it is more rational and 
fair in reflecting the company's real financial condi-
tion. In addition, accrual basis can provide flexibili-
ty to the management in choosing an accounting 
method as long as it does not deviate from the ap-
plicable financial accounting standards. However, 
the companies always choose the accounting me-
thod in accordance with the conditions. This ac-
counting method chosen deliberately by the man-
agement for a particular purpose is known as earn-
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ings management. 
In general, the problem of earnings manage-
ment is an agency problem that is often triggered by 
separating the roles with different interests between 
the owner (shareholder) and the manager (manage-
ment) of a company. Furthermore, management, as 
the company manager, can obtain information about 
the company faster, more completely and more va-
lidly than the shareholder. Therefore, the manage-
ment is required to provide information about the 
company's condition to the owner. 
However, the information submitted by the 
manager sometimes does not match the actual con-
ditions of the company because the manager tends 
to report something that maximizes his utility. This 
condition is known as information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry occurring between the 
management (agent) and the owner (principal) 
provides an opportunity to the manager to act op-
portunistically for personal benefit (Ujiyantho 
2007). It is the information asymmetry which later 
becomes the trigger of the emergence of earnings 
management practices in the company. The profits 
quality generated from the operations of the com-
pany is influenced by the way how the financial 
reports are made by managers. 
One way to monitor contract issues and limit 
opportunistic management behavior is by imple-
menting corporate governance. The main principles 
of good corporate governance are transparency, 
accountability, fairness, and responsibility. Thus, 
corporate governance is directed at reducing in-
formation asymmetry between principals and 
agents, that ultimately which is expected to minim-
ize earnings management action. 
Based on the above arguments, it is necessary 
to do a research on the effectiveness of good corpo-
rate governance in banking industry. The characte-
ristics of banking industry are different from those 
of other industries because they have more strin-
gent regulation than other industries. Banking in-
dustry is a "trust" industry. If investors lose confi-
dence due to biased financial statements, as a result 
of earnings management actions, they will with-
draw their funds simultaneously that in turn can 
lead to rush. To overcome such an issue, banking 
companies need various mechanisms to minimize 
the earnings management, one of them is by im-
plementing corporate governance. Therefore, this 
study aims to examine and find out the influence of 
corporate governance mechanism on earnings 
management in Indonesia. 
This study used banking industry, with the 
category of conventional index. Conventional bank 
is a bank which runs its business conventionally by 
providing payment traffic services. There are two 
methods performed by conventional banks in run-
ning the conventional principles, Martono (2002): 1) 
Setting interest as a price, either for savings prod-
ucts (savings and time deposits) or for loan prod-
ucts (credit), based on certain interest rates; 2) For 
other bank services, the bank uses or applies vari-
ous fees in a nominal or a certain percentage. This 
costing system is called fee based. 
Research by Rahmawati et al. (2006) in banking 
industry showed that information asymmetry had 
a significant and positive effect on earnings man-
agement. Thus, the higher the information asym-
metry, the higher the earnings management per-
formed by the company management. However, 
the results of the research by Lasdi (2013) in manu-
facturing industry showed that information asym-
metry had no effect on earnings management dur-
ing the crisis in 2008-2011. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESIS 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory is the basic theory that underlies the 
company's business practices. The theory is derived 
from the synergy of economic theory, decision 
theory, sociology, and organizational theory. The 
main principle of this theory states that there is a 
relationship in the existence of a working relation-
ship between the party who gives authority, ie the 
investor, and the party who receives the authority 
(agency), or the manager (Rahmawati 2012). 
 
Bid-Ask Spread Theory 
According to Subali and Diana Zuhroh (2002), Bid-
ask Spread is the difference between the highest bid 
price, causing the investor to buy certain stocks and 
the lowest ask price, causing the investor to sell the 
stocks. The bid-ask spread which functions as 
transaction costs affects trading and causes inves-
tors to hold assets having higher or lower transac-
tion costs longer or shorter. 
 
Earnings Management 
Earning management is defined as the choice of a 
manager in determining accounting policies to 
achieve certain goals (Scott 2003: 369). Earnings 
management is not always interpreted as an ad-
verse negative effort, because earnings manage-
ment is not only oriented to profit manipulation. 
The formula used to measure earnings man-
agement is as follows: 
DAit = TAit – NDAit. (1) 
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Information Asymmetry 
The information submitted by managers sometimes 
does not fit the actual condition of the company 
because their report tends to maximize their utility. 
This condition is known as information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry can occur when the man-
agers have more information about the company 
than the owner or stockholder do. Thus, the man-
agement, in this case, will try to manipulate the 
company performance reported for their own (He-
rawaty 2008). 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
Good corporate governance is a way of working, a 
way of making decisions and as a rule arrange-
ment, which determines the relationship among 
shareholders, managers, creditors, government, 
employees, and other internal and external stake-
holders in accordance with their rights and respon-
sibilities. The principles of good corporate gover-
nance can be used as a model to compare whether 
the government institutions or other agencies are 
good or bad. 
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Earning Management 
Information asymmetry is a condition in which the 
agent has more information about the company 
and its prospects in the future than the principal. 
Such information is considered one of the causes of 
earnings management practice. Richardson (1998) 
examined the relationship between information 
asymmetry and earnings management in all com-
panies listed on NYSE in 1988-1992, and found that 
there was a systematic relationship between the 
magnitude of information asymmetry and the level 
of earnings management. 
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Earnings Management with GCG as a Moderating 
Variable 
The global-financial crisis that hit the world is an 
accumulation of corporate actions that violate 
sound business rules of good corporate gover-
nance, in the form of lack of transparency from the 
management to the shareholders. This lack of 
transparency has led to information gaps between 
management and shareholders. 
The role of good corporate governance can di-
rectly reduce information asymmetry. Kanagaret-
man et al. (2007); and Meilani (2009) succeeded in 
proving that good corporate governance affected 
information asymmetry during the earnings an-
nouncement. When making the earnings an-
nouncement, the company expected a good corpo-
rate governance to ensure the balance of informa-
tion distribution so that no private information 
occurred. 
Based on the description above, the research 
hypotheses can be formulated as follows: 
H1: Information asymmetry has an effect on earn-
ings management. 
H2: Good corporate governance moderates infor-
mation asymmetry to affect earnings management. 
The framework underlying this research can be 
described as in Figure 1. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample Classification 
This study used banking sector companies as the 
population. They are listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX)) in 2010-2014. The sample was tak-
en by a purposive sampling method for obtaining 
representative sample with the following criteria: 
(1) Banking companies issuing financial statements 
for the period of 2010-2014, (2) Stock price data is 
available during the period of observation. (3) The 
available data is complete, including the data 
needed to calculate the information asymmetry, the 
data needed to detect earnings management, and 
the data on banking companies’ GCG reports in the 
period of 2010-2014. 
 
Research Data 
Based on the formulation of the problem and the 
purpose of the study, this research is categorized as 
quantitative research in which the data used are 
based documentation research. The documentation 
was undertaken by collecting all secondary data, 
i.e. the data obtained or collected from the pub-
lished financial statements of the company. Source 
of data is taken from data obtained through website 
www.idx.co.id and www.yahoofinance.com. 
 
Variable Identification 
There are three variables identified in this study, 
namely dependent variable (earnings manage-
ment), independent variable (information asymme-
try), and moderating variable (good corporate go-
vernance). 
 
Operational Definition of Variables 
Earnings Management 
The dependent variable in this research is earnings 
management. Earnings management is a condition 
in which management intervenes in the process of 
preparing financial statements, such as leveling out, 
raising, and lowering earnings reporting. The mea-
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surement of earnings management was done by 
calculating the discretionary accrual using the fol-
lowing formula: 
DAit = TAit – NDAit. (2) 
NDAit = TAit  –  (α0 + α1COit + α2LOANit + 
α3NPAit+ α4∆NPAit+1 + ɛit). (3) 
TA = α0  +  α1 COit + α2 LOANit + α3NPAit + 
α4∆NPAit+1 + ɛit. (4) 
Explanation: 
DA = Discretionary Accruals 
TA = Total Accruals 
NDA = Non-Discretionary Accrual 
α0 = Constants 
α1, α2, α3, α4 = Variable Coefficients 
COit = Credit written off 
LOANit = Loan provided 
NPAit = Non Performing Assets 
ΔNPAit + 1 = NPA ratio one year to and with NPAt. 
 
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry arises when managers 
know more about the internal information and the 
company’s prospects than stockholders do. This 
study measures information asymmetry using rela-
tive bid-ask spreads (Rahmawati et al. 2007: 79) 
operated as follows: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 ,𝑡 =
(𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑖,𝑡)
(𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑖 ,𝑡)/2
× 100.  (5) 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
Good Corporate Governance is corporate gover-
nance that explains the relationship among various 
participants in the company that determines the 
direction and performance of the company (Monks 
and Minow 2003: 6). The measurement of this vari-
able is conducted using GCG self-assessment com-
posite chart of the annual financial statements. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is used to provide an overview 
or explanation of the overall variables used in this 
study: earnings management, information asymme-
try, and good corporate governance. Table 1 shows 
the descriptive test results. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of earn-
ings management using 73 sample data (N) derived 
from 15 banking companies each year from 2010 to 
2014. The minimum value of earnings management 
in Table 1 is 0.0095, belonged to PT Bank QNB In-
donesia Ltd (BKSW) in 2013. So, it can be con-
cluded that the earnings management conducted 
by the manager of PT Bank QNB Indonesia Ltd 
(Kesawan) (BKSW) was the lowest compared to 
other banks sampled during the period of 2010-
2014. 
The maximum value of earnings management 
in Table 1 is 0.6910, belonged to Bank Pundi Indo-
nesia Ltd 2010. This is because the banking has a 
value of TAit and the existence of NPAit which has 
a value higher than in previous years. Thus, it can 
be concluded that the manager of Bank Pundi In-
donesia Ltd performed the highest earnings man-
agement compared to other banks sampled in this 
study period 2010-2014. The overall value of the 
discretionary accruals of the banks in this research 
is positive, which means that the managers of all 















Descriptive Analysis Results 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Earnings Management 73 0.0095 0.6910 0.136385 0.0953586 
Information Asymmetry 73 0.0000 4.3027 2.078492E0 1.2171902 
Good Corporate Governance 73 1.000 3.000 1.52589 0.441707 
Source: Processed data. 
Information Asymmetry Earnings Management 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
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management by means of income maximization. 
The mean value of earnings management is 
0.1364 with a standard deviation of 0.0953586. This 
means value can determine the percentage of bank-
ing company data that has earnings management 
level above and below that mean value. The percen-
tage of company data with the earnings manage-
ment level below the mean value is 26%, while the 
percentage of company with earnings management 
level above the mean value is 74%. This indicates 
that most of the banking industry companies have 
the earnings management level above the mean val-
ue. Thus, it can be said the earnings management 
pattern performed by the managers of these banks, 
by way of lowering the profit, made the company 
able to increase the burden of depreciation and 
amortization by increasing the age of property. 
Table 1 also shows the descriptive statistics of 
the independent variable of information asymme-
try measured using bid-ask spreads. The SPSS dis-
play output shows the number of samples (N) of 73 
companies. The minimum value of information 
asymmetry in this study is 0.0000, owned by Bank 
of India Indonesia Ltd. The maximum value of in-
formation asymmetry is 4.3027, owned by Bank 
Internasional Indonesia Ltd. The mean value of 
information asymmetry using bid-ask spread mea-
surement from 73 companies is 2.079 with a stan-
dard deviation of 1.2172. 
During the study period 2010-2014, there were 
9 banking companies (82%) of 15 banking compa-
nies that had information asymmetry above 2.079, 
while 6 banking companies (18%) of 15 banking 
companies had information asymmetry below 
2.079. This proved that the information asymmetry 
measured using the bid-ask spread during the 
study period 2010-2014 was high. When the infor-
mation asymmetry was high, the shareholders did 
not have sufficient resources or access of relevant 
information to monitor the manager actions, thus 
providing space or opportunity for managers to 
perform earnings management practices. The exis-
tence of information asymmetry encourages com-
pany managers to present non-actual information, 
especially when the information is related to the 
company's performance measurement. 
Table 1 also shows the descriptive analysis of 
good corporate governance data from 2010 to 2014, 
with the number of companies (N) of 73 banking 
companies. The mean value of N is 1.5258, with 
standard deviation value of 0.441707, maximum 
value of 3.000 and minimum value of 1.000. In this 
case, a good corporate governance of a banking 
industry is said to be good if the composite value is 
1.000. In this study, the composite value of 1,000 is 
found in several banks, including Bank Central 
Asia Ltd, Bank CIMB Niaga Ltd, and Bank OCBC 
NISP Ltd. There are also some banks that have 
composite value less than 1.5258, for example Bank 
International Indonesia Ltd (in 2010 2011, and 2012) 
has composite value of 1.100 and PT. Bank Mandiri 
(Persero) Ltd (in 2010 and 2011) had composite 
value of 1.100. 
The banking companies that have composite 
value of more than 1.5258, among others are Bank 
of India Indonesia Ltd with composite value in 
2010 and 2011 of 1.680, and Bank Mega Ltd in 2012 
of 1.730. While the banking company that had a 
maximum value of 3.000 was Bank Tabungan Ne-
gara (Persero) Ltd in 2013. 
 
Results of Analysis and Discussion 
The test results of the first hypothesis, related to the 
influence of information asymmetry on earnings 
Table 2 
Results of Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis Variables Adjusted R Square Regression Coefficients t count Sig 




-0.060 -1.975 0.052 
GCG 0.059 3.318 0.001 
Interaction -0.102 -2.139 0.036 
 
Table 3 





IA GCG Interaction 
1. DA= 0.062 + 0.036AI 0.002   
2. DA= -0.002 + 0.037AI + 0.040GCG 0.000 0.084  
3. DA= 0.231 – 0.060AI – 0.102GCG + 0.059AI*GCG 0.052 0.036 0.001 
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management, can be known from the significance 
value. If the value of Sig-t < 0.05, which means that 
H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted (independent 
variable has an influence on dependent variable). If 
the value of Sig-t ≥ 0.05, which means that H0 is 
accepted and H1 is rejected (independent variable 
has no influence on dependent variable). Based on 
Table 1, it shows that the significance value of in-
formation asymmetry is 0.000. The significance 
value of information asymmetry (IA) is < 0.05, 
which means that information asymmetry has a 
significant influence on earnings management. 
Thus, H0 is rejected and H1 is accepted, indicating 
that information asymmetry has an influence on 
earnings management. 
The test results of the second hypothesis, re-
lated to the influence of information asymmetry on 
earnings management with good corporate gover-
nance as moderating variable, can be seen from the 
significance value of information asymmetry (IA) 
and moderating test between information asymme-
try and GCG (interaction). Table 2 shows that the 
significance value of information asymmetry is 
0.052. The significance level of IA is > 0.05, which 
means that information asymmetry has no signifi-
cant effect earnings management. 
The GCG modulating variable (interaction) 
shows a significance level of 0.001. The significance 
level of interaction is < 0.05, which means that the 
GCG moderating variable has a significant influ-
ence on the effect of information asymmetry on 
earnings management. To determine the type of 
GCG moderating variable based on the MRA crite-
rion, is by comparing the three regression equa-
tions. Here is the summary output of the regression 
equation 1, 2, and 3. 
Table 3 shows that the significance level of 
GCG moderating variable in regression equation 2 
is 0.084 and in regression equation 3 is 0.036, mean-
ing that GCG variable as independent variable is 
not significant at the significance level of 5%. On 
the contrary, the significance of GCG as a moderat-
ing variable in regression equation 3 is 0.001 which 
means significant. Thus, by comparing the three 
regression equations above, it is found that β2 = 0 
(not significant) and β3 ≠ 0 (significant). Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the GCG variable is the 
pure moderator variable, since equations 1 and 2 
are not different, but it must be different from equ-
ation 3 or (β2 = 0; β3 ≠ 0). 
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Earnings Management 
Managers have more information about the com-
pany capacity and organizational environment as a 
whole than the shareholders or investors do. In 
presenting the financial statements, they also have 
more complete and flexible information that can 
influence financial reporting to maximize their util-
ity. Such a condition is often called information 
asymmetry, a condition where there is a gap or 
imbalance of acquisition of information obtained by 
the managers and stakeholders, as the users of in-
formation, and the management, as a the provider 
of information. 
Information asymmetry is measured using 
stock spreads. The higher the difference between 
the bid and ask spread, the higher the information 
asymmetry. Conversely, the smaller the difference 
between bid and ask spread, the lower the informa-
tion asymmetry. Thus, a high spread indicates that 
banking company's stocks are not liquid because of 
the large buying and selling demands. In addition, 
the company also dares to speculate on the offer of 
sale and purchase. The stocks of a company reflect 
the value of assets, liabilities, and earnings value 
(Dedhy et al. 2009: 13). 
Earnings information is usually used as a 
guidance or basis for making decisions. This condi-
tion makes the financial statements biased because 
the users only tend to see the earnings information 
in the income statement only. This can in turn en-
courages the managers of banking companies to 
present irrelevant financial statements and unrelia-
ble financial reports. This action is called earnings 
management. Earnings management is, therefore, 
measured by discretionary accrual proxy, i.e. the 
accrual that may change according to management 
policies. Given the conditions of information 
asymmetry, managers can influence the accounting 
figures presented in the financial statements by 
means of earnings management (Ilham 2013). 
The results of the first hypothesis testing, re-
lated to the effect of information asymmetry on 
earnings management, can be known from the sig-
nificance value. Table 2 shows that the significance 
level of information asymmetry is 0.000, which is 
smaller than the significance level of 0.05, indicat-
ing that H0 is rejected and H1 accepted. This shows 
that information asymmetry has an influence on 
earnings management. 
The results of this study are in line with those 
conducted by Rina (2011) and Rahmawati et al. 
(2007) that information asymmetry has an effect on 
earnings management. This shows that the higher 
the information asymmetry occurring between 
shareholders and managers, the greater the likelih-
ood of managers performing earnings management 
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actions within the company. The results of the re-
search that state that information asymmetry has an 
effect on earnings management indicate that there 
is an indication in the process of investment deci-
sion making, then the investors consider whether 
there is earnings management performed by man-
agers or not. This occurs because there is a gap or 
imbalance of information between the shareholders 
and the managers of the banking company. 
 
The Influence of Information Asymmetry on 
Earnings Management with Good Corporate Go-
vernance as Moderating Variable 
The principles of good corporate governance are 
the rules and norms that serve as guidelines for 
corporate leaders and employees so that they can 
do their jobs and make decisions to support the 
interests of both companies and shareholders. GCG 
involves the interests of shareholders (principal) 
and managers (agents) which are based on GCG 
principles consisting of fairness, efficiency, transpa-
rency and accountability. GCG principles are likely 
to influence the information asymmetry actions 
undertaken by managers to shareholders, so as to 
minimize earnings management actions aimed at 
improving their utility. 
The result of the second hypothesis testing on 
the influence of information asymmetry on earn-
ings management with good corporate gover-
nance as moderating variable can be seen from the 
significance value of information asymmetry (IA) 
and moderating test between information asym-
metry and GCG (Interaction). Based on Table 3, 
the significance value of the GCG, as moderating 
variable (interaction), is 0.001 or smaller than the 
significance level of 0.05. This means that GCG, as 
a moderating variable, influences the effect of in-
formation asymmetry on earnings management. 
After conducting analysis based on the type of 
moderating variable, it is found that GCG is a 
pure moderating variable, because equations 1 
and 2 are not different, but different from equa-
tion 3 or (β2 = 0; β3 ≠ 0). 
The results of this study show that GCG varia-
ble has a significant positive effect on earnings 
management, which means that the greater the 
GCG, the lower the earnings management. The role 
of good corporate governance can directly reduce 
the information asymmetry actions. This research is 
in line with the research conducted by Kanagaret-
man et al. (2007); and Meilani (2009), that good cor-
porate governance has an affect on information 
asymmetry at the time of earnings announcement, 
because at the time of making earnings announce-
ment, good corporate governance is expected to 
ensure the balance of information distribution, so 
that no private information occurs. 
The results of this study also indicate that 
GCG, as moderating variable, can reduce the effect 
of information asymmetry actions performed by 
corporate managers on earnings management. In 
addition, GCG may weaken information asymme-
try actions on earnings management. This may be 
caused by a lack of gaps or unbalanced information 
between shareholders and managers and the exis-
tence of proper oversight. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study aims to examine the influence of infor-
mation asymmetry on earnings management with 
good corporate governance as a moderating varia-
ble in banking Industry Company’s period 2010-
2014. The results of regression analysis, t test, and 
R2 test show that information asymmetry has an 
influence on earnings management. And the results 
of MRA test indicate that GCG moderates the influ-
ence of information asymmetry on earnings man-
agement. 
This study, however, has some limitations such 
as 1) it is limited to only one independent variable, 
(2) the sample is only using conventional bank, (3) 
the composite valuation is only using ratings for 
GCG self-assessment in 2013-2014, and (4) ) the 
acquisition of information asymmetry data is using 
daily high-low stock only. 
This study suggests that further researchers in-
clude the number of research variables, both inde-
pendent and moderating variables, expand the re-
search sample by adding sharia banks, use self-
assessment rating to assess the measurement of 
GCG, and measure the information asymmetry 
using daily bid-offer stock data. 
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